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DDS&T-2317/82

13 MAY 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Director of Research and Development
Director of Development and Engineering
Director of SIGINT Operations
Director of Technical Service
Director of National Photographic Interpretation Center

FROM: Leslie C. Dirks
Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT: NSSD 2/82 - Countermeasures Capability of the
United States to Meet the Total Hostile
Intelligence Threat

1. The subject study has the enthusiastic support of the DCI, the NSC and the President.

2. The thrust of this study is to convey to the NSC and the President the deficiencies which have been allowed to develop in the United States' ability to protect itself from foreign intelligence activities and the resource commitments necessary for those deficiencies to be overcome.

3. I am asking each of you to examine your activities and provide me with your frank evaluations and suggestions of what you feel is required in both personnel and equipment or changes in operational procedures to protect your activities from hostile foreign intelligence activities. This is to include personnel, physical and operational security.

4. To lessen any concerns you may have as to who will pay for these resources, none of the additional resources will come out of our hide. These will be from new budgeted items.

5. I would like to receive your responses by C.O.B. Thursday, 20 May 1982.

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Leslie C. Dirks

Attachments:
3 for guidance

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Attachment A

DEFINITIONS FOR TERMS OF REFERENCE AND
OUTLINE FOR NSSD 2/82 STUDY

Threat or Intelligence Threat: The combination of capability and intent on the part of a foreign country to engage in an intelligence activity inimical to the United States.

Multidisciplinary Threat: The aggregate, irrespective of collection method or technique, of all the intelligence threats posed by a given country or country group.

Vulnerability: The potential for information to be acquired through intelligence activity. Vulnerability is independent of the threat, i.e., a vulnerability may exist even though no capability or intent exists to exploit it.

Security: Establishment and maintenance of protective measures which are intended to ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. Security requirements typically establish a required level of protection based on vulnerability rather than threat.

Communications Security: The application of security to deny unauthorized persons information which might be derived from telecommunications or to ensure the authenticity of telecommunications.

Personnel Security: The application of security to assure that persons granted access to information are loyal and trustworthy.

Physical Security: The use of guards, barriers, containers, alarms and other physical means to protect material, facilities or documents from damage, theft or unauthorized access.

Document Security: The protection of documents through the use of classification designators and their associated access controls.

Computer Security (also Automatic Data Processing Security): The protection of computers and data processing equipment and the information they contain through a combination of physical, personnel and communications security, as well as hardware, software and management controls.

Operations Security: The protection of an operation, project or program from hostile intelligence activities. Operations security establishes protective requirements based upon a comparison of vulnerabilities and the multidisciplinary threat. Operations security differs from other security programs in that it focuses on the threat.

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Counterintelligence: "...information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document or communications security programs." (E.O. 12333) Counterintelligence differs from security in that it is normally directed against a specific known or postulated threat.

Intelligence Countermeasures: The aggregate of all measures taken to provide protection from the intelligence activities, irrespective of method or technique, of foreign countries. Intelligence countermeasures include counterintelligence, operations security, and security. (Also called multidisciplinary counterintelligence).

Active Measures: A Soviet term for activities beyond traditional diplomacy which are used to achieve Soviet foreign policy objectives. Active measures are most frequently carried out by the intelligence services and are intended to influence the policies of foreign governments, disrupt relations between other nations, undermine confidence in foreign leaders and institutions or discredit opponents.

GUIDANCE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY DIRECTIVE 2/82
ON "DETECTING AND COUNTERING THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE THREAT
TO THE UNITED STATES"

- o An Executive Summary of no more than a dozen pages will be prepared.
- o A supporting paper of greater detail but limited to manageable length.
- o The threat capabilities and deficiencies assessments should be drawn to the extent feasible from previously prepared studies and submitted in summary form in order that the emphasis can be placed on the sufficiency of U.S. countermeasures and what added resources are needed.
- o To minimize redundancy, discussions should be separate for each discipline and include only the most significant aspects of the threat within that discipline. The USSR and the PRC are to be treated individually; other countries or blocs can be cited as is deemed appropriate, i.e., Warsaw Pact, Communist Bloc Asia, Cuba, "friendlies," etc.
- o For all disciplines, the key hostile intelligence services targets are to be cited and a summary judgment made as to the state of U.S. capabilities to protect these targets.
- o The Human Sources discipline is to consider such key aspects as the legal presence, illegals, visitors, overt collection, recruitments/penetrations, etc.
- o Countermeasures against SIGINT, Imagery and Acoustic Intelligence threats are to include operational component countermeasures, specifying why and how and the effect.
- o The Active Measures discipline is to deal with aspects of media manipulation, front organizations, agents of influence, and the like.
- o Projected resource needs are to be detailed and specific in terms of manpower and funding and phase-in periods. Anticipated results should be related to projected requirements.

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Each of the listed hostile intelligence disciplines will be examined from four aspects.

see p. 1)

1. THREAT

- A summary evaluation of the threat broken down by each hostile country or appropriate groups of countries
- In CONUS
- Overseas
- Interrelationship of hostile countries

Study Director/
Staff

2. U.S. OBJECTIVES

FBI, CIA, DoD)

3. U.S. CAPABILITIES -- Including aspects of (a) detection, collection and investigation, (b) analysis and assessment, and (c) countering

- Description of the existing and programmed countermeasures of each agency involved in countering the specific hostile discipline
- Coordination between agencies
- Information/document, physical, personnel, communications, computer, industrial security to be included as annexes

FBI, CIA, DoD)

4. DEFICIENCIES

- Perceived shortfalls
- Legal, procedural and resource-impacting policy limitations
- Free vs closed society

FBI, CIA, DoD)

5. RESOURCE CONSIDERATIONS

- Current
- Projected 1985 to 1990 needs

OUTLINE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY DIRECTIVE 2/82 STUDY

National Security Study Directive 2/82 is intended to result in a comprehensive analysis of the countermeasures capability of the United States to meet the total hostile intelligence threat. (S)

This will be accomplished in a detailed examination of each hostile intelligence discipline to include:

HUMAN SOURCES

CIA/DDO/DoD)	- Espionage	
CIA/DDO & DDI,	- Technology transfer	- Legal and Illegal
D/DIA, NSA)		- Clandestine

SIGINT

CIA/DDI, DoD)	- Satellites
CIA/DDI, DoD/	- Ships - AGIs
, Navy)	- Merchant Ships
	- Submarines
CIA, DoD/DIA,	- Aircraft - Standoff
	- Civil Overflights
CIA, FBI)	- Legal establishments
	- External fixed sites
DoD, FBI)	- Land bridges

IMAGERY

CIA, DoD)	- Satellites
CIA, DoD)	- Merchant ships
CIA, DoD)	- Aircraft

ACOUSTIC INTELLIGENCE

DoD)	- Ships
DoD)	- Aircraft
DoD)	- Sensors

ACTIVE MEASURES

Classified and Extended by 05
Reason for Extension FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 (2 and 3)
Date of Review for Declassification April 5, 2002

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date

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REMARKS

*F-XI**4 - Exec Reg. file*

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